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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSITION:
Notes On Policy-Praxis-Research Interactions and Dialectics 
By Reginald Herbold Green
Pessimism of the intellect, 
Optimism of the will.
- Gramsci
Aye but a man's reach must exceed his grasp 
Or what's a heaven for?
- Barratt
We who are undefeated only because 
we have gone on trying.
- Eliot
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Mega and Micro; Then, Now and Then
By its nature any brief paper on the interaction of policy, praxis and
research in the context of Namibia’s political economy of transition must be a
tour d’horizon not an articulated agenda for action. The question is what
type of tour (and what type of tour guide and tourist?).
There are several sets of interactions and tensions - probably best viewed as
dialectical relationships and certainly as processes.
a. Strategic issues (mega) and their elucidation/resolution are a 
precondition for setting up, articulating and following through on 
macro and micro ones. e.g. one cannot - beyond a point - define 
policies to be pursued relative to the EEC or to personpower 
development without facing what production structures and 
relationships are sought strategically.
b. But without knowledge of what is and what is attainable at micro 
and sectoral level the mega (strategic) level will remain ill 
defined, full of gaps and non operational. e.g. the critique of 
existing historical materialist work on Namibia during the periods 
of pre-colonial neo-colonial and colonial occupations as too 
theoretical with inadequate empirical foundations and too speedily 
generalized from too few cases.
c. To attempt to define and act on strategy or policy without knowing
where one is and how one came to be there is rather like setting 
off for Windhoek without first determining whether one is east of 
Gobabis or south of Luderitz and whether one has to hand a 
functioning vehicle with petrol in the tank. Parallel
considerations underly many of the issues dividing the 'dependency 
school' internally and from the other fractions of Marxian and/or 
structuralist analysis.
d. On the other hand to concentrate solely on the present and its 
objective constraints - or on the historic process and the 
facetiousness of many past attempts to alter it by pure optimism of 
the intellect - can lead either to fatalism or to a view that only
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very marginal willed change is ever possible. The ’new 
conventional wisdom’ on Sub-Saharan Africa (Berg, Bank and Co.
Ltd.) illustrates the second and the simpler variants of the 
Wallerstinian 'world systems' model the first.
Any practical resolution of these contradictions - which in both policy/praxis 
and research can be very antagonistic indeed - must be dialectic or iterative. 
Neither a simple Cartesian either/or (whether verbal, simple econometric or 
sophisticated computer modelled) nor a linear sequence (from any starting 
point) offers much hope of progress (in knowledge or of results) or at any 
rate not fast enough nor at a bearable enough cost to be anything less than 
appalling in the Namibian political economy of transition context. Academic 
and applied research mistakes like strategic and policy ones immiserize, 
repress and kill real human beings, and it is too easy for researchers and 
policy workers to overlook (or suppress in their own minds) this objective 
reality because they are rarely the victims most or most immediately affected.
Vantage Point
These notes are written from the vantage point of a generalist political 
economic policy and strategy advising and articulating civil servant albeit of 
one with (for better or for worse) an academic background and an analytical 
approach. Equally they are written from the point of view of a commitment to 
the political economic liberation of the people of Namibia and therefore to 
SWAPO.
This vantage point has - like any other - its limitations. Research with no 
very evident (or intended) operational significance cannot be central to 
agenda building from a strategy-policy-praxis viewpoint even if it is accepted 
that all additions to knowledge may have objective practical implications. If 
one believes that the prime purpose of understanding reality is to (know how 
one can) change it, research will tend to be priority ranked (often wrongly) 
in terms of its apparent direct relevance to achieving change - a system which 
raises problems in respect to at least some (clearly not all) historical 
research. Further research with claims to direct applicability which are 
clearly premature (e.g. a good deal of economic modelling) or objectively 
wrong (e.g. a good deal of "effective protection" and "(in)efficient import
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substitution" analysis) arouse a degree of fury that relates not to their 
intellectual weaknesses (nor to how they might be overcome) but to the danger 
that their application will do very real harm. Research suggesting that 
nothing significant can be done at policy/strategy level (as opposed to 
identifying what can and what cannot) is - understandably - ignored or 
opposed, e.g. the variants of Nabudere's or Wallerstein's work suggesting that 
a Third World progressive policy analyst should move to the centre to cause 
change there and/or firmly avoid 'veritable transitory power' because it is 
premature to attempt serious change now and the attempt will in some objective 
sense 'make matters worse'. Finally research which is grounded in historic 
processes and present objective (including process) constraints, posits 
alternatives which are practicable once attained but notably fails to fill the 
gap between with much beyond 'optimism of the intellect' (e.g. much of Samir's 
work) has a fascination for the analytical strategy/policy worker but also 
arouses a sense of frustration more than challenge, because the gap is 
precisely in respect to that face of reality confronting him/her (albeit the 
politcal economic strategic and policy profession is, so male dominated him is 
almost literally accurate).
The importance of understanding this vantage point lies immediately in the 
fact that it informs this paper but more basically in that - usually not very 
explicitly put or reflected on - it informs relations (including clashes and 
non-communication) among the strategy-policy-praxis and academic research 
communities. (Whether all research is - or should be -academic and 
intellectual is a different topic. It does not appear to be on the agenda of 
this meeting which is clearly within the standard view of serious research as 
carried on by a self trained, defined and perpetuating elite or sub-class.)
Some Assumptions
Only strategy-policy-praxis agenda must be based on certain assumptions about 
present and future reality. Otherwise the number of variants expands so 
rapidly that it is neither intellectually, nor even physically, portable. 
Among the most important used here are:
1. Namibia will become independent within the forseeable future (18-60 
months). If not changes in objective reality will require a
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complete rechecking of the agenda, e.g. the personpower situation 
is so different now from 1977 (in this case better) that certain 
constraints necessarily assumed then may not apply now;
2. There will be a negotiated - not a purely military transition.
This is a necessary corollary of the first assumption but also has 
basic implications for the state of the productive base (material, 
personnel, institutions);
3* The government of independent Namibia will be formed by SWAPO. Or
trivially I am not a logical discussant and much more fundamentally 
most of the assumed strategic goals need reexamination in terms of 
who the dominant coalition (whether in party, interest group or 
sub-class terms) is;
4. There will not be an active war on the Orange River border. The 
agenda for a siege economy with Oranjemund permanently 
non-operational would be quite different;
5. South Africa will continue to hold Walvis Bay after independence.
Combined with the third assumption this puts creating (recreating) 
an alternative port at the top of the agenda (albeit the research 
implications do not flow primarily to that fraction of researchers
- social science - represented here);
6. The territorial economy will be depressed but functioning. This
follows from the first two assumptions and defines the broad 
productive constraints and possibilities - and to a degree 
priorities quite differently from those which would pertain were 
SWAPO to inherit either the 1977 colonial economy in full swing or 
an economic wasteland in which almost nothing was operating in a 
fashion amenable to normal economic analysis or management a la 
Uganda 1980);
7. There will be a rapid and significant exodus of Europeans
especially among expatriates (as opposed to "Sud Westers"), 
Afrikaners and public sector personnel but not a near immediate
tidal wave (i.e. qualitatively more, more rapidly than Zimbabwe
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but less, less rapidly than Mozambique). The limits of what can 
and cannot be kept running and/or added and of what can/must be 
transformed (or abandoned) how and how fast depend crucially on 
this assumption.
8. The so-called External debt* issued by the AG will be repudiated.
As the likely level of the paper issued will be at least equal to 
national product and the ’debt service’ to half of exports and of 
domestic tax revenue this (or the reverse) assumption has massive 
external account and government budget ’room for manoeuvre’ 
implications.
9 • Relations with South Africa will be poor but with no immediate or 
total ruptive in economic relations. This would appear to be the 
necessary (on the poor) and probable (on the less than total break) 
result of assumptions 2, 3> 7 and 8.
The point about these assumptions is not whether I - or anyone else - likes 
them. It is that they are crucial to formulating a strategy/policy and an 
applied research agenda. If - to the extent - they are wrong, agenda revision 
is - will be - needed.
Action - Research: A Priority - Sequence View
The political economic transition in Namibia will be characterised by a very 
large number of actions which it is necessary to take - at some time - and 
even more which it would be desirable to take - at some time. It will be 
equally characterised by shortages of most resources - not least of data, 
analyses and analytical capacity and senior decision taken time - but not 
equal shortages of all and, indeed, surpluses of some (e.g. unskilled labour 
power in general, potentially at least, beef).
Therefore, identifying priorities and sequences will be critical as will be 
determining what scarce, relatively available and surplus resources an action 
will require. Top priority and urgency actions requiring scarce resources 
need to come first; scarce resource intensive actions which are critical but 
less urgent deferred; surplus resource using actions which raise relevant
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production/incomes slotted in as early as their scarce resource demand 
component can be met.
Presumably similar considerations apply to research in its own right. 
However, the present concern is that to be informed action needs data and 
analytical bases. The costs of not having these vary widely. For many 
purposes the present territorial product (but not external accounts) data may 
be adequate as they are almost certainly as plausible and as plausibly 
estimated as those of a majority of SSA states (which may not be saying 
much!). The costs of using levelling, channelling and heavy machinery 
techniques on the Oshana country without prior geological, soil engineering 
and agro-economic research could be very different - hopelessly mixing good 
scil, sand and clay into an infertile conflatorate and cracking the hard pan 
over a salt lake creating a second Etosha Pan.
Five broad typological categories can be identified. The first is action 
which is both critical and urgent for which either adequate initial data to 
begin action exist or the most urgently needed research is comparative - not 
Namibian. Mining (once an analysis of personnel requirements, skill levels 
and present staff is completed) is an example of the first. Central Banking 
is an example of the second sub-category. Examination and analysis of what 
has been done, why, with what results in - say - Botswana, Zambia and Tanzania 
is more immediately action relevant than study and analysis of the history and 
present of the Reserve Bank of South Africa - let alone its Windhoek branch.
The second comprises action which is critical and likely to be urgent as soon 
as data and analysis are available to identify what can be organised and what 
sequences are practicable and time efficient. A key example of the first is 
historical and present marine and transport engineering research on Swakopmund 
and its vicinity oriented to identifying how, how fast, and at what cost an 
interim alternative main port can be put into operation (6 months or 16? $25
or $200 million?). A somewhat less critical area for research are the present 
irrigation programmes to see how they can be utilised which leads into the 
second sub-category in determining what expansion, transformation, 
modification and generalisation routes are both technically practicable and 
political economically consistent with SWAPO goals. A similar key area is 
urbanisation: how many households (however defined) will move to or be
reunited where? What urban infrastructure (including housing) actions are
necessary? Socially acceptable? Political economically valid? Who should 
carry out which? How? Except for the harbour study these examples all 
involve both quite deep social science and quite specific technical research 
topics and are unlikely to be handled satisfactorily without an interactive 
alliance of both. (Research is not just social science research - as the 
makeup of this conference might suggest - nor is it plausible to suppose 
social science and technical research can be kept in separate boxes without 
very serious mismatch consequences.)
A third cluster include actions which cannot be defined properly for urgent 
implementation or cannot - however important - be scheduled until more data 
and analysis is available. The large ranching sector is an example of the 
first sub-category. Instant attention is needed but neither technically, 
organisationally nor in production relations terms can a practicable and 
desirable action programme be articulated on the basis of present data. The 
northern mixed farming zone (excluding, perhaps, the Okavango Valley) 
exemplifies the second sub-category. Far more data is needed before more than 
a quite limited range of actions on technology, productivity, production 
patterns and institutional/social relations topics can be defined (let alone 
taken) without high risk of catastrophic and potentially irretrievable 
mistakes. Of necessity action must be postponed but the same necessity argues 
that relevant reseacrh be begun yesterday to limit the delay before action can 
sensibly be taken (or sensible action be taken).
A fourth group comprises topics on which action is important but clearly must 
be deferred because other calls on the same scarce resources have higher 
priority. However, research - subject to the same caveat about greater 
sequential priority calls on capacity! - can and should begin earlier to 
improve the data and analysis base and to reduce the probability of mistakes 
when the sequential process puts these topics on the immediate action agenda. 
One example is commercial banking. Nationalism, Marxism and applied economic 
common sense all counsel against a system which is dominantly foreign, private 
and traditional. But the government budgetary process, the Central Bank and 
reconstruction of specialised public sector financial institutions will strain 
relevant decision taking, analytical and personnel capacity to (one may fear 
beyond) the breaking point. If these actions are botched, takeovers of or 
entries into commercial banking will be meaningless. If they succeed, the 
existing banks can - for a time - be controlled to some extent and more
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permanent transformations determined and acted on .later (say 3 to 7 years 
after independence). Tertiary education - except specialised research and 
training components which must be in Namibia, to produce Namibian specific 
data or skills, or to provide an interface with external (e.g. elsewhere in 
SADCC) research and training - is another such topic. The fact that a campus 
exists (the least critical input) is no reason to found a university at 
independence. As no SSA state has an even remotely satisfactory tertiary 
education sector (and the university proper is often the weakest component in 
terms of results but one dominating and corroding the sector) there is a 
strong case for research and reflection first quite apart from the personnel 
(student and staff) constraint.
The fifth category is one in which action is needed but nobody at present has 
any clear idea what it might be or even with what broad themes. An example is 
the status - role - participation - exploitation/subordination - liberation of 
women. Here the strategy-policy worker can, at most, put a very general 
agenda forward for research; the researcher (and a fortiori in the example the 
women) are likely to have much better intuitions and conceptualisations of 
both concrete and systemic/conceptual topics.
Action - Research: A Constraint-Requirement Optic
Action can also be typologized in terms of constraints and requirements viewed 
dialectically both in terms of their interaction at any one time and over 
time. This again requires research inputs. In the case of the Namibian 
political economy of transition in Namibia at least five such themes can be 
identified.
1. Keep the core of the economy (including public services) operating. 
Without a functioning Rossing, Oranjemund and Tsumeb there will not 
be the surplus, the tax base or the foreign exchange to do much of 
anything. Without much of the existing hospital/clinic network 
there will be no foundation from which to build comprehensive 
health services whether community centred or otherwise. Without a 
functioning power station and water purification plant in Windhoek 
the lights will go out and cholera come in. Without a functioning 
large scale ranching sector the livelihoods of up to 60,000
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households will vanish.
Researchers - especially change oriented social science researchers 
- are often prone to forget or undervalue this constraint as are 
political leaders at (less so a few years after) independence. But 
those involved in action tend to draw the bounds of the core too 
widely and to pay too little attention to the longer term impact of 
means used, e.g. to keep European civil servants on present scales 
and to unify black salaries at those levels ensures either 
inability to finance necessary service expansion, near bankruptcy 
or traumatic cuts in citizen salaries a few years later (vide 
Zimbabwe’s mix of all three). On these issues research is urgently 
needed in the Namibian context informed by comparative experience.
2. Restore key bits which have broken down. Much the same 
considerations apply as to the first theme.
3* Lay a basis for advance by initial additions to productive forces
and services. The problem is not to devise a list but to select - 
"to plan is to choose" - a practicable initial short list. The 
author’s would include personpower development (including national 
language, literacy and upgrading), water, urban family housing, 
crop production, the Trans Kalahari Railway, a mineral export 
company, import houses (realistically joint venture) with global 
sourcing capabilities.
Researchers are at least as good as strategy-policy workers at 
identfying areas for action and better at working through their 
implications. However, to be effective in influencing action they 
do need to pay more attention to priorities and sequences, e.g. not 
push rural electrification without explaining why they believe it 
ranks ahead of near completion of rural basic health - education - 
water - access to markets - production support services.
4. Identify key parametric (structural) constraints. A systematic,
fairly simple model of an economy can allow identification first of 
what the constraints on growth, investment, external transactions, 
public expenditure are and - given reasonable assumptions - will
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remain over a 3 to 7 year period. It can also help identify what 
sectoral disaggregations and questions need to be asked because 
they relate to key elements of overall constraints. A current 
exercise for Zimbabwe (involving a senior strategy-policy worker 
and a semi-outside researcher) has proved very interesting - not 
least in showing that certain seriously canvassed 
strategies/actions would be recipes for political economic suicide. 
A similar exercise for Namibia at or just after independence might 
be very valuable and would require a systematic research programme 
both as to data and as to analysis to allow a plausible model to be 
constructed or adapted.
The critical point about using this approach is to keep it 
dialectic. The constraints are the necessity that defines freedom 
of action in the short term - as researchers seem prone to 
underrecognize. But they are also the guide to the necessary 
action to ensure that there are greater degrees of freedom for 
years 8 - 1 5  viewed from year 7 than for years 1 - 7 viewed from 
year one, a point strategy-policy workers under heavy strain to 
avoid present breakdowns are prone to let "loose the name of 
action".
5. Identify a process/strategy of sequential change in an intended 
direction and how to keep it going
Strategy-policy workers and researchers alike are often too quick 
either to reject the Chinese proverb "Even the longest journey 
begins with the first step" or its implicit corollaries: the first 
step must be taken, and followed by more steps, overall in the 
right direction (even if probably not in a straight line) and with 
attention to seeing that early steps do not lead one to a point at 
which further steps are impossible. Removing de facto racial 
salary scales, setting new scales and using accelerated promotion 
constitute a good example of an area in which more thought, less 
blocages and even less haste, more speed apply and in which more 
case by case, conceptual and applied research is critical if 
Namibian decisions are to avoid a series of pitfalls.
In terms of processes and dynamics, researchers need to pay more
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attention to what Chairman Mao called the "question of method". To 
analyze why it is critical to raise northern Namibian small 
agricultural unit productivity, incomes and control over production 
relations is a good deal easier (at some levels it is obvious) than 
it is to identify how. (That, in fact, is the basic flaw in 
Tanzanian agricultural strategy - and to all the alternatives 
proposed to date - especially in respect to productivity.) 
Strategy-policy workers need to pay more attention to the 
implications of means used to places reached - e.g. the present 
ranch support system in Namibia is remarkably technocratic, 
bureaucratic and paternalistic and, in the context of - say - 
worker self managed ranches less able to argue with it and 
technically more dependent on it than white ranchers, its 
maintenance and reinforcement on present lines would raise a series 
of basic questions more likely to occur to politicians and 
researchers and to be systematically addressed by the latter than 
by strategy-policy workers.
In dialectical terms the problem appears to be one of identifying 
immediate, critical, overcomable (secondary?) antagonistic 
contradictions and overcoming them in ways which raise (or make 
accessible) a further round of such contradictions and to do so in 
ways that do not pose too many or too basic contradictions before 
they can be overcome.
Most historical materialist research and discourse in Africa 
(whether by outsiders, semi-outsiders or Africans) has been 
singularly weak in respect to attention to the material basis of 
production, objective constraints, method and the process of change 
seen from a dialectic (rather than an apocalyptic or single leap) 
perspective.
Action - Research: Some (Sub) Class Approach Queries
Strategy-policy workers rarely formulate decisions and actions in articulated
sub-class terms even if (as is usually not the case) they are acting on quite
explicit political concerns/instructions and examination of alternatives/
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results cast in those terms. The reasons appear to be twofold:
Tactically it is usually dangerous to specify a sub-class which is to be 
eroded or out-flanked unless it is isolated and weak (in which case the action 
may not be all that significant) or can be characterised (charicatured) so 
broadly and unfavourably that most members of the sub-class can deny (indeed 
often not percieve) they are targets. (e.g. Tanzania’s erosion and 
eradication of the old co-op regional and national superstructure was 
basically an attack on the capitalist sub-class with the greatest potential to 
put together a serious capitalist road sub-class coalition. Precisely for 
that reason it was never publicly - and rarely privately - presented in those 
terms.)
Practically, research on sub-classes and their interests, perceptions and 
interactions is so patchy, problematic and arcane in form as to make even 
serious action analysis, much less public justification, in such terms very 
difficult at best and often impossible (e.g. Zimbabwe has systematically 
raised munimum wages to counter food subsidy reductions. But do ’’informal 
urban’’ incomes move parallel to the minimum wage as they appear to do in 
Tanzania but not in Kenya? Are the food deficit households in communal areas 
largely ones with an urban wage earner member or not? Until these questions 
can be answered the sub-class - as well as income distribution - implications 
of the present practice are obscure.)
From an action oriented point of view, the most immediately important research 
is not on the history/historic evolution - alteration of sub-classes in 
Namibia nor even in their present formations and interactions. There are 
likely to be very rapid changes - e.g. the present 40,000 odd black "salariat 
petty bourgeoisie’’ is too disparate in relation to production, attitudes to 
nationalism and relevance to independent Namibia and too recent a product of 
steps to ’’buy Bantustans”, "placate nurses and teachers" and "buy off mine 
labour forces" for even a definitive present analysis to do more than form a 
base for ongoing research on its evolution, fragmentation, decomposition and 
alliance building after independence.
A number of ’’practical" questions relate to classes/sub-classes. For example 
what are the main types of household in the north, in urban areas, etc? 
Indeed have permanent households consisting of a woman and children become the
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norm in some (or many) areas? What implications does this have for stated 
SWAPO, SWC and church policies on reuniting households? For urbanisation? 
For the status/liberation of women?
How do mixed "peasant/proletarian" households (assuming for the moment this is 
a sub-class of, rather than for, itself) perceive their interests? Why? What 
implications does this have for the - macro economically and, on the face of 
it, socially - logical strategy of seeking to have fewer, larger, more
productive ’peasant' households on the one hand and reconstituted, complete 
wage earning households on the other? (In Zimbabwe this strategy is clearly 
meeting very substantial resistance on the part of the intended 
’beneficiaries'.) What are the implications for land access rights? For
creating production opportunities for women outside agriculture? For
retirement security systems? For the relationships of women to production, 
decision taking and men more generally?
Strategy-policy workers simply will not (at least in the first years of
Namibian independence) have the time to do the research necessary to answer 
these questions. (Nor will researchers if they insist on definitive answers 
before saying anything firm and policy oriented.) They very badly need (even 
if many, perhaps most, do not and will not realise it) collaboration with, and 
assistance by, researchers.
Envoi
After 30 years of research (25 in or in relation to Sub-Saharan Africa, 9 in 
relation with Namibia - UNIN - SWAPO) and 20 of overlapping strategy-policy 
work I am not so foolish as to expect definitive solutions of the tensions let 
alone instant research work on all the Namibian topics and questions posed.
However, I do believe first steps can be taken and that it is imperative that 
they be taken now. Among those steps is a franker, more focussed dialogue 
among strategy-policy workers and researchers (as well as a broader and less 
monastic or elitist definition of who is a researcher and a clearer perception 
that human beings should be subjects not objects of research as of strategy, 
policy and praxis). Many present incomprehensions, lacks of fruitful 
interaction and mutual distrusts or denigrations (though by no means all)
♦
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could be reduced with more contact and dialogue and few can be in their 
absence.
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